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This paper examines the question to what extent premia for macroeconomic risks in
banking are sufficient to avoid banking crises. We investigate a competitive banking
system embedded in an overlapping-generations model subject to repeated
macroeconomic shocks. We show that even if banks fully incorporate macroeconomic
risks into their pricing of loans, a banking system may enter bankruptcy with probability
one. A major cause for this default is that risk premia of a competitive banking system
may become too small if the capital base is low.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Severe banking crises are ubiquitous in our times. A banking crisis occurs when
a large number of banks fails to meet regulatory capital requirements, is illiquid,
or is insolvent. Most banking crises can be attributed to negative macroeconomic
shocks, including their amplification mechanisms. Many investigations provide
empirical evidence that the crises in Latin America of the 1980s and early 1990s,
those in East Asia later that decade, and the more prolonged stagnation in Japan,
for example, were to a large extent caused by negative macroeconomic events;
see, e.g., Borio (2003). The devastating effects of banking crises on economies,
including budgetary consequences of possible government bailouts, have brought
the problem of optimal policy design to the top of the international policy agenda.
A fundamental question for any policy design in banking and in crisis manage-
ment is to what extent a banking system is capable of protecting itself against
macroeconomic risks and thus against financial instabilities.
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Based on a dynamic macroeconomic model with overlapping generations and
financial intermediation, the present paper addresses the issue of to what extent
premia for macroeconomic risks protect against banking crises. Free exit and free
entry in a competitive banking sector determine the price for macroeconomic risks,
which is reflected by the risk premium of loans. Deposits are implicitly insured. The
model complements earlier business cycle models with financial intermediation
such as Boyd and Prescott (1986), Williamson (1987), Uhlig (1995), and Schreft
and Smith (1997), which do not focus on banking crises.
Two insights into the vulnerability of a competitive banking system to macroe-
conomic shocks will be provided. First, risk premia charged by banks will depend
on their capital base. It is intuitively clear that risk premia are small when the
capital base of the banking system is small. Indeed, at the limit when bank capital
is zero, the risk premium vanishes, because otherwise the return on bank cap-
ital would become arbitrarily large. As a consequence, a banking system with
low capital is more vulnerable to a further decline of capital than a system
with high capital. Second, if bank capital is below a critical level, the banking
system will default with certainty in finite time. The reason for this is a vi-
cious circle. Repeated negative macroeconomic shocks spill over to the balance
sheets of banks and lower their bank capital. As risk premia decrease, the likeli-
hood of further declines of capital increases. Over time the banking system will
default.
The focus of this paper is on economic results. Detailed justifications of the
setup and the nature of market failures and a discussion of related literature are
found in Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2004, 2007). This paper is organized as
follows. In the next section we introduce the model. Existence and uniqueness of
temporary equilibria with financial intermediation are discussed in Section 3. A
stochastic difference equation governing the evolution of bank capital is set up
in Section 4. In Section 5 we analyze the relationship between default probabi-
lities and risk premia, and in Section 6 the default risks of the banking system.
Section 7 concludes.
2. MODEL
2.1. Entrepreneurs and Depositors
Consider an overlapping-generations (OLG) model with financial intermediation
in which one physical good that can be used for consumption or investment.
Time is infinite in the forward direction and divided into discrete periods indexed
by t . Each generation consists of a continuum of agents with two-period lives,
indexed by [0, 1]. Each agent of each generation receives an endowment e of goods
when young and none when old. Generations are divided into two classes. One
fraction of agents, indexed by [0, η], are potential entrepreneurs; the other fraction
are consumers and are indexed by (η, 1]. Potential entrepreneurs and consumers
differ in that only the former have access to investment technologies.
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Consumers are endowed with intertemporal preferences over consumption in
the two periods of their lives. Let u(c1t , c2t ) be a standard intertemporal utility
function of a consumer, with c1t , c2t denoting youthful and old-age consumption
of a consumer born in period t , respectively. Given the endowment e when young
and a deposit interest rate rd, each young household saves the amount s(rd).
Aggregate savings of all households are then denoted by S(rd) and given by
S(rd) = (1 − η)s(rd).
Potential entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral and consume only when
old. Each entrepreneur decides whether to save his endowment or to invest into
a production project that converts period-t goods into period-(t + 1) goods. The
funds required for an investment project are fixed to e + I so that an entrepreneur
must borrow I additional units of the good from banks in order to undertake
the investment project. Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous, as the quality of their
investment projects depends on their index i. The quality parameter of entrepreneur
i is assumed to be a private signal given by 1 + i. If an entrepreneur of type i
obtains additional resources I and decides to invest, his output y in the next period
is determined by
y = q(1 + i)f (e + I ),
where f denotes a standard atemporal neoclassical production function. The pa-
rameter q ∈ [q, q] describes the macroeconomic shock affecting the productivity
of the entrepreneurs and thus causing fluctuations of aggregate output.
All entrepreneurs are price takers and operate under limited liability. They may
apply for a loan contract at a bank that offers intermediation services. Given a loan
interest rate rc, the expected profit of an investing entrepreneur i is
(i, rc) :=
∫ q
q
max{(1 + i)qf (e + I ) − I (1 + rc), 0}µ(dq),
where µ denotes the probability distribution of the shocks. Note that (i, rc)
is increasing in quality levels i and decreasing in loan rates rc. Entrepreneurs
face a binary decision problem, such that a risk-neutral entrepreneur with quality
parameter i ∈ [0, η] will invest, if
(i, rc) ≥ e (1 + rd). (1)
2.2. Banking Sector
There is a competitive banking system with limited liability that consists of n (n >
1) identical banks, indexed by j = 1, . . . , n, which are owned by entrepreneurs.
Banks finance entrepreneurs and maximize profits or bank capital accruing to
current shareholders. Transfer of ownership of banks to the next generation occurs
through bequests. Because the banking industry is perfectly competitive and the
number of banks is assumed to be large, banks take deposit and loan rates as
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given. However, banks freely decide whether or not to offer their intermediation
services.1
Each bank j can sign deposit contracts D(rd), where 1 + rd is the repayment
offered for 1 unit of resources. Loan contracts of bank j are denoted by C(rc),
while 1 + rc is the repayment required from entrepreneurs for 1 unit of funds. All
deposit and loan contracts last for one period. Banks act as delegated monitors,
as depositors can observe neither the quality of investment projects nor whether
entrepreneurs invest or consume their funds. They are assumed to be able to secure
both the investment of an entrepreneur and the liquidation value in case of default.
By (1), banks do not have to fear low-quality entrepreneurs applying for loans, as
they are always better off with saving endowments.
The time line of actions in the economy within a typical period t is as follows:
1. Old entrepreneurs pay back with limited liability. Banks pay back old depositors.
2. Given rd and rc, banks decide whether to exit and to invest their capital somewhere
else. If they stay in business, they offer their intermediation services.
3. Consumers and entrepreneurs decide which contracts to accept. Resources are ex-
changed.
4. Young entrepreneurs produce, subject to a macroeconomic shock.
We assume that deposit rates are guaranteed for all possible macroeconomic
shocks. This assumption is adopted for two reasons. First, deposits are implicitly
insured when the next generation has enough bailout incentives. Second, without
deposit insurance, the willingness of consumers to save may decline when the
banking system faces a positive default probability. This, in turn, could accelerate
an actual default. In this sense, the assumption that deposits are insured by the next
generation provides a lower bound on default probabilities of a banking system.
To simplify the exposition, we set the costs of intermediation to zero and make
the following assumptions regarding the behavior of banks. Banks operate under
limited liability. Depositors randomly choose a bank that offers its intermediation
services in order to save. Similarly, entrepreneurs applying for a loan contract
choose banks randomly. Throughout the paper, we assume that uncertainty is
canceled out when depositors and entrepreneurs randomly choose banks. That
is, each active bank obtains the same amount of deposits and loans. Loans are
constrained by the amount of deposits obtained. If entrepreneurs applying for
loans are rejected, they will randomly choose a bank and save.
Finally, banks can exit completely, but cannot partially reduce their equity while
offering intermediation services. The assumption can be justified in several ways.
First, it might be derived as an equilibrium phenomenon when banks are allowed
to reduce their equity and deposits are not insured under all circumstances. For
instance, consumers, upon observing the levels of equity, may decide to deposit
their resources only at banks that have the highest level of equity, because those
banks have the lowest default probability. Second, banks that offer their services
are required by regulation to hold a certain amount of equity. Basel I and in the
future Basel II are regulatory frameworks that stipulate such capital requirements
for banks.
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3. TEMPORARY EQUILIBRIA
To derive an intermediation equilibrium, we assume that savings are never suffi-
cient to fund all entrepreneurs, so that
S(rd) = (1 − η) s(rd) < η I for all rd ≥ 0.
Otherwise all entrepreneurs would receive funds independent of their quality. Let
d denote the current capital base of the banking system. An individual bank has an
equity level of dj = dn . As all banks are assumed to be identical, we will formulate
the equilibrium conditions for the whole banking system and hence focus directly
on the evolution of the aggregate bank capital d.
There are two boundary values for d. Let Smax := max{S(rd) : rd ≥ 0} denote
maximal aggregate savings and set d := ηI −Smax > 0 for an upper bound for the
capital bases. If d > d , we assume that banks pay excess capital to bank owners.
On the other hand, if d ≤ 0, then the capital base of the banking system has
vanished, causing a default of the system. Thus an intermediation problem arises
only when d ∈ (0, d]. For each d ∈ (0, d] and each rd ≥ 0, there exists a unique
critical entrepreneur iG ∈ [0, η], given by
iG = iG(d, rd) := ηI − S(r
d) − d
e + I ,
such that aggregate demand for loans is balanced by loan supply; that is,
[
η − iG(d, rd)
]
I = S(rd) + e iG(d, rd) + d, d ∈ (0, d]. (2)
Let d ∈ (0, d] be the current level of bank capital at the beginning of an
arbitrary period. Suppose banks raise funds S(rd)+ e iG(d, rd) that have to be
paid back with interest at the end of the subsequent period. Suppose that banks
lend [η − iG]I to firms. Then they will receive payments P = P(iG, q, rc) at the
end of the period, given by
P
(
iG, q, r
c
) =
∫ η
iG
min{(1 + i)q f (e + I ) , I (1 + rc)} di,
where iG = iG(d, rd). Given a pair of interest rates rd, rc, the capital function of
the banking system is given by a function G(·, q, rd, rc) : (0, d] → R, defined by
G(d, q, rd, rc) = P (iG(d, rd), q, rc)− [S(rd) + e iG(d, rd)] (1 + rd), (3)
such that for each shock q and each rc, rd ≥ 0, G(d, q, rd, rc) is the capital
base of the banking system at the end of the period. The expected capital of banks
which operate under limited liability is then E[max{G(d, q, rd, rc), 0}]. Formally,
a temporary equilibrium with financial intermediation is defined as follows.
DEFINITION 1. Let d ∈ (0, d] denote the current level of bank capital. A
temporary equilibrium with financial intermediation (TEFI) is a pair of interest
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rates (rd∗ , r
c
∗) such that the following conditions hold:
E[max{G(d, · , rd∗ , rc∗), 0}] = d (1 + rd∗ ) (4)

(
iG(d, r
d
∗ ), r
c
∗
) = e (1 + rd∗ ) (5)
S(rd∗ ) + e iG(d, rd∗ ) + d =
[
η − iG(d, rd∗ )
]
I. (6)
Condition (4) is the no-exit and no-entry condition for banks. Of course, the
condition has to be applied to an individual bank. As the condition for an individual
bank is obtained by dividing both sides in equation (4) by the number of banks, it
is convenient to work directly with the aggregate condition. Condition (5) states
that all entrepreneurs i ≥ iG(d, rd∗ ) invest, whereas all entrepreneurs i < iG(d, rd∗ )
save. The spread rc∗ − rd∗ is the premium that banks obtain for bearing macroeco-
nomic risks. Condition (6) states that aggregate demand for loans is balanced by
loan supply. It determines the critical investing entrepreneur iG(d, rd∗ ), independent
of equilibrium loan interest rates. If aggregate savings S(rd) is increasing in rd,
then iG is decreasing in d and rd.
Existence of temporary equilibria with financial intermediation is established as
follows. Assume to this end that the productivity of the entrepreneur with quality
level η2 is on average greater than unity; that is,
(
1 + η2
)
E[q]f (e + I )
I
> 1.
The following existence theorem is the foundation of our further analysis.
THEOREM 1. Consider a competitive banking system operating under limited
liability. Let the following conditions be satisfied:
(i) The productivity of the entrepreneur with quality level η2 is on average greater than
unity and there exists an interest rate rd with
0 < rd <
(
1 + η2
)
E[q]f (e + I )
I
− 1,
such that (0, 0) > e(1 + rd) > (η, rd).
(ii) Aggregate saving S(rd) is nondecreasing in rd and
S(rd) + η e > (1 + rd)S ′(rd) for all 0 ≤ rd ≤ rd.
(iii) Let rc0 > 0 denote the loan interest rate with (0, rc0) = e, such that the entrepreneur
with the lowest quality level i = 0 will invest for rd = 0. Assume that average
repayments to banks are sufficiently high, so that
E
[
P
(
0, · , rc0
)]
ηI
≥ 1.
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Then for each d ∈ (0, d] there exists a unique TEFI, given by the interest rates
(rd∗ (d), r
c
∗(d)) ∈ [0, rdUB] × [rcLB, rcUB]. The lower and upper bounds rcLB > 0, rdUB,
and rcUB are defined by

(
0, rcLB
) = e (1 + rcLB), (η, rdUB) = e (1 + rdUB), (η, rcUB) = e,
respectively.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given by Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2004). Observe
that Condition (ii) induces an upper bound for the savings elasticity of consumers,
which is automatically satisfied for an inelastic savings function as well as for a
savings function with elasticity less than unity. By setting an appropriate spread
rc∗ − rd∗ , banks earn returns on capital that are high enough to ensure that there is
no incentive to exit. It is intuitively clear that risk premia must be nonnegative.
Formally, we show in Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2004):
COROLLARY 1. The equilibrium deposit rate rd∗ (d) is decreasing in d ∈
(0, d]. Risk premia are nonnegative, so that rc∗(d) − rd∗ (d) ≥ 0 for all d ∈ (0, d].
4. EVOLUTION OF BANK CAPITAL
In this section we describe the evolution of capital in the banking system. Adverse
macroeconomic shocks may lead to bankruptcy of entrepreneurs and to low re-
payments to banks, thus affecting the evolution of bank capital. Let dt ∈ (0, d]
denote the capital base of the banking system at the beginning of a period t , where
we allow the banking system to start with an arbitrary level d0 ∈ (0, d]. At the
beginning of period t , banks raise funds S(rd∗ (dt )) + e iG(dt , rd∗ (dt )), which must
obey (2) and which have to be paid back with interest at the end of that period. Write
i∗(dt ) := iG(dt , rd∗ (dt )) for the critical entrepreneur in a competitive equilibrium
and let the equilibrium interest rates be rc∗(dt ), rd∗ (dt ) given by Theorem 1. Then,
given a shock qt , the new level of bank capital dt+1 is determined by
dt+1 = min{G∗(dt , qt ), d}, dt ∈ (0, d], (7)
where, using the capital function of the banking system (3), the map G∗(·, qt ) :
(0, d] → R is defined by
G∗(dt , qt ) := P(i∗(d), q, rc∗(d)) − [S(rd∗ (d)) + e i∗(d)] (1 + rd∗ (d)).
Note that we account for the fact that excess capital above d will be distributed
among old entrepreneurs only. Thus, possible dividend payments will affect neither
savings nor investment decisions.
The map (7) is continuous in both arguments and describes a stochastic differ-
ence equation. Because {qt }t∈N is an iid process, the sequence of capital {dt }t∈N
generated by (7) is a Markov process. If dt+1 ≥ 0, then all depositors have been
repaid and dt+1 represents the banks’ capital at the beginning of period t + 1. If
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dt+1 < 0, then the banks incur losses and dt+1 is the amount of liabilities that
could not be covered by loan repayments of entrepreneurs. In this case the banking
system has negative equity and is bankrupt.
Finally, if d ∈ (0, d] is the level of bank capital of an arbitrary period, the
aggregate income of the economy is
Y (d, q) = e +
∫ η
i∗(d)
(1 + i)q f (e + I ) di.
The influence of bank capital d on Y (d, q) in our model is ambiguous, because
the effect of d on the critical entrepreneur i∗(d) in a TEFI is ambiguous under
the hypotheses of Theorem 1. On the one hand, higher bank capital allows the
financing of more entrepreneurs. On the other hand, high bank capital induces
low deposit rates and thus low savings. Which of the two effects dominates the
other will essentially depend on consumer preferences. If the savings elasticity is
sufficiently low, then aggregate income Y is increasing in d.
5. RISK PREMIA AND DEFAULT PROBABILITIES
Having established the existence of temporary equilibria, we investigate the role
of risk premia in the default probability of entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur with
quality level i enters bankruptcy if he is unable to fully pay back his credit, that
is, if
I (1 + rc) > q(1 + i)f (e + I ).
The entrepreneur with the lowest quality level who is not bankrupt after encoun-
tering the shock q is given by
iB
(
iG, r
c, q
)
:=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
iG if q ≥ qNB
(
iG, r
c
)
,
I (1 + rc)
qf (e + I ) − 1 if qTB(r
c) < q < qNB
(
iG, r
c
)
,
η if q ≤ qTB(rc),
where
qNB
(
iG, r
c
)
:= I (1 + r
c)
(1 + iG)f (e + I ) and qTB(r
c) := I (1 + r
c)
(1 + η)f (e + I ) . (8)
If shocks are sufficiently positive, q ≥ qNB(iG, rc), no entrepreneur enters
bankruptcy and the bank profit is maximal. For shocks qTB(rc)< q <qNB(iG, rc),
all investing entrepreneurs with quality levels iG ≤ i < iB(iG, rc, q) enter
bankruptcy, whereas entrepreneurs with quality levels i ≥ iB(iG, rc, q) pay back
their loans fully.
In the case when entrepreneurs with sufficiently high quality never default,2
Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2004) show that the map G∗ that drives the evolution
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of bank capital takes the convenient form
G∗(d, q) = I [η − i∗(d)][rc∗(d) − rd∗ (d)] + d(1 + rd∗ (d))
− 1
2
qf (e + I ) [iB(i∗(d), rc∗(d), q) − i∗(d)]2. (9)
Equation (9) reflects the fact that risk premia serve as a buffer against losses due
to bankruptcies, which occur as soon as iB(i∗(d), rc∗(d), q) > i∗(d). Notice that
qNB(i∗(d), rc∗(d)) ≥ qNB(iG(0, 0), rcLB), so that the probability for bankruptcies is
positive independent of the capital base if qNB(iG(0, 0), rcLB) > q.
The default probability of entrepreneurs in a TEFI is now straightforward to
formalize. For an arbitrary capital base d ∈ (0, d], if qNB(i∗(d), rc∗(d)) > q, then
the probability that entrepreneurs enter bankruptcy is positive and given by
Prob
(
iB(i∗(d), rc∗(d), ·) > i∗(d)
) =
∫ qNB(i∗(d),rc∗(d))
q
µ(dq) > 0.
On the contrary, if qNB(i∗(d), rc∗(d)) ≤ q, then no entrepreneur enters bankruptcy
with certainty. Proposition 1 in Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2004) demonstrates
how a competitive banking system incorporates macroeconomic default risks of
entrepreneurs. If the probability of bankruptcies amongst entrepreneurs is zero
(i.e., qNB(i∗(d), rc∗(d)) ≤ q), the risk premium for banks is zero, rc∗(d) − rd∗ (d) =
0. As soon as the probability of bankruptcies among entrepreneurs is strictly
positive (i.e., qNB(i∗(d), rc∗(d))> q), the risk premium for banks is strictly positive,
rc∗(d) − rd∗ (d) > 0. Note that the return on bank equity is given by the deposit rate
rd∗ (d) and hence equilibrium intermediation margins only reflect the default risk
of entrepreneurs.
It turns out that risk premia will become arbitrarily small if the capital base of
the banking system tends toward zero. For this purpose, consider the case in which
for sufficiently small d ∈ (0, d] the probability that high-quality entrepreneurs do
not enter bankruptcy is positive. Using the definition in (8), we see that this is the
case if
qNB(i∗(d), rc∗(d)) ≤ qNB
(
iG
(
0, rdUB
)
, rcUB
)
< q for sufficiently small d > 0.
We are now in a position to state the following proposition.
THEOREM 2. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 1, let qNB(iG(0, rdUB), rcUB) <
q. Then the risk premia will vanish with a vanishing capital base; that is,
lim
d→0
[rc∗(d) − rd∗ (d)] = 0.
Theorem 2, whose proof is given in Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2004), has
important implications. If a banking system has lost most of its capital, the risk
premia decline, and hence the risk of a further decline of bank capital increases. At
the limit where bank capital approaches zero, the risk premium vanishes. In order
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to explain this result, we observe that for a low level of bank capital a positive
premium implies a very large return on equity ex post, if the macroeconomic shock
turns out to be sufficiently favorable. In such circumstances, banks earn more from
the vast majority of loans than the deposit rate. As equity is small in relation to
deposits and loans, return on equity becomes very large. Because negative shocks
imply zero equity, a small risk premium is sufficient to generate the ex ante return
on equity demanded by shareholders.
6. DEFAULT OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
We will now investigate the possibility of a default of the banking system. We
will show that the probability of a default of the banking system is positive if
the capital base is below a certain threshold, which will be denoted by dcrit. This
result is a consequence of the fact that risk premia may become arbitrarily small,
as shown in Theorem 2. If a bank’s capital base is too low, then banks will be
unable to cover losses from bankruptcies of entrepreneurs. To formulate our next
result, recall that bankruptcies of entrepreneurs occur with positive probability for
all d ∈ (0, d], if qNB(iG(0, 0), rcLB) > q.
PROPOSITION 1. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 1, suppose that
qNB(iG(0, 0), rcLB)> q. Then there exists a critical capital level dcrit ∈ (0, d] such
that the banking system defaults with positive probability; that is,
P(G∗(d, ·) < 0) > 0 whenever d < dcrit.
The proof of Proposition 1 is found in Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2004). The
underlying economic forces that are at work here are reflected in (9). A level of
bank capital below dcrit makes the banking system vulnerable to default in two
ways. First, the buffer against defaults of entrepreneurs is small. Second, the risk
premium is small, and even medium-sized macroeconomic shocks may lead to a
decline in bank capital.
The following argument now shows that a banking system may default in finite
time with probability one, if the productivity of entrepreneurs is too low. Suppose
there exists a critical shock qcrit > q such that the capital base will decrease for
shocks below qcrit; that is,
G∗(d, q) < d for all d ∈ (0, d], q ≤ qcrit.
Then a series of sufficiently numerous shocks qt , . . . , qt+τ below qcrit will lead to
a series of decreasing capital bases
dt+1 = G∗(dt , qt ) > · · · > dt+1+τ = G∗(dt+τ , qt+τ )
that will finally take on a value below zero, thus causing a default of the banking
system. This argument is illustrated in Figure 1 for a series of five successive
shocks.
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G* (·,qhigh)
G* (·,qlow)
dt
dt+1
d0dcrit
FIGURE 1. Bank default after a series of shocks qlow, qhigh, qlow, qhigh, qlow.
Let T0 denote the first time for which the capital base of the banking system has
vanished and the system has accumulated losses, that is, the first time for which
dT0 < 0. The following theorem states that this event occurs in finite time with
probability one, implying that the banking system will default in finite time with
probability one.
THEOREM 3. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 1, let qNB(iG(0, 0), rcLB) > q
and suppose that
P
(
iG(0, 0), q, rcUB
)
I [η − iG(0, 0)] − 1 <
S(rd∗ (d))
Iη
rd∗ (d) for all q ≤ qNB
(
iG(0, 0), rcLB
)
.
Then for an arbitrary initial capital level d0 ∈ (0, d] the banking system will default
in finite time with probability one; that is, P(T0 < ∞) = 1.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2004). It im-
plies that a banking system cannot protect itself from a default. A default which will
occur with certainty if the return on loans P(iG(0, 0), q, rcUB)/(I [η − iG(0, 0)])−1
is too low. In this case a vicious circle starts. Repeated negative macroeconomic
shocks lower the equity of banks until it ultimately lies below the critical level dcrit.
Further negative macroeconomic shocks then lead to a downward spiral of bank
capital. As equity declines, the risk premium decreases, which in turn increases
the probability of further declines in bank capital. Over time the banking system
will default.
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7. CONCLUSION
We investigated the default problem of a banking sector embedded in a dynamic
macroeconomic model, where free entry and exit determine premia for aggregate
risk. Our results suggest that vulnerabilities of a banking system may build up
over time, while at the same time risk premia decline. This creates the danger of
large-scale defaults of banks.
NOTES
1. The free-entry free-exit framework is a standard concept in industrial economics; see, for
example, the recent work by Vives (2004), who integrates many free-entry models with innovation
activities.
2. A sufficient condition is qTB(rcUB) < q.
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